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GAULT
Donald E. McInnis,* Shannon Cullen** & Julia Schon***
Since the arrival of the Pilgrims, American jurisprudence has
known that its law-breaking children must be treated differently than
adults. How children are treated by the law raises ethical and
constitutional issues. This Article questions the current approach, which
applies adult due process protections to children who are unable to fully
understand their constitutional rights and the consequences of waiving
those rights. The authors propose new Miranda warnings and a Bill of
Rights for Children to protect children and their constitutional right to
due process under the law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, through its decision in
Miranda v. Arizona,1 requires criminal suspects to be warned of their
Fifth Amendment rights before being interrogated.2 In doing so, it
created certain safeguards to ensure the police do not coerce
incriminating statements from suspects.3 First among those safeguards
are the right to legal counsel and the right against self-incrimination.4
But how those rights are advised and waived by suspects has produced
a long history of judicial decisions. This is particularly true when it
comes to juvenile suspects.
The Supreme Court has decided more cases regarding the
interrogation of juveniles than any other aspect of the juvenile justice
system.5 Over the years, the Court has questioned whether juvenile
suspects have the legal and psychological capacities to understand
their constitutional rights, and whether they have the ability to
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights when
questioned by adults.6 Although the Court has cautioned trial judges
in regard to the immaturity of minors and minors’ inability to invoke
or waive their Miranda rights, the Court has not mandated any special
procedural protections for juveniles.7 Instead, it has applied the adult
standard of review by looking, after the fact, at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the waiver of the minors’ Miranda rights.8
Today, the overwhelming weight of scientific evidence shows
that the mind of a juvenile is insufficiently developed to fully
understand the ramifications of Miranda warnings.9 Accordingly, the
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id. at 444–45.
3. Id. at 437.
4. Id. at 442.
5. Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of
Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 27 (2006).
6. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661–68 (2004); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707, 727–28 (1979); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52–55
(1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598–601 (1948).
7. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55; see also
Claire Chiamulera, Juvenile’s Age is a Factor in Miranda Custody Analysis, AM. B. ASS’N (July 1,
2011), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_
practiceonline/child_law_practice/vol30/july_2011/juvenile_s_age_isafactorinmirandacustodyana
lysis/ (discussing J.D.B. v. North Carolina).
8. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725.
9. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1152 (1980); Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of
Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 50 CT. REV. 70, 70 (2014).
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time has come to consider stronger protections for minors when they
come in contact with the authorities. This is particularly true when
minors are subjected to a custodial interrogation. The toll on youths
and their families, as well as on the judicial system, can no better be
demonstrated than by the cold hard fact that thousands of minors have
been exonerated following convictions based on false confessions—
an exoneration rate three times that for adults.10
The predominant cause of this woeful rate of false confessions is
the lack of safeguards to protect minors’ inability to understand the
meaning of a Miranda admonishment and the consequences of
forgoing their constitutional rights. Only with a heightened level of
security provided to juveniles, beginning with their first contact with
police and through questioning and arrest, can society avoid repeating
the mistakes of the past.
This Article provides a review of the development of juvenile
rights from the time of the earliest colonists to the requirement of due
process for minors defined by In re Gault,11 and the current post-In re
Gault era. Proposed are new, simplified Miranda warnings for
children and a Children’s Bill of Rights. It is hoped that, through these
reforms, the rights promised to juveniles by In re Gault will be
fulfilled.
II. FIRST JUVENILE EXECUTION
The first documented juvenile execution in North America was
that of Thomas Granger, age sixteen.12 Thomas was “cast by . . . jury
and condemned, and after executed” in Plymouth Colony, on
September 7, 1642,13 for a crime of the biblical ages: “if a man lie with
a beast, he shall surely be put to death: and ye shall slay the beast.”14
The matter of Thomas Granger first arose when a witness reported to
10. New Study Finds False Confessions More Likely Among Juveniles, INNOCENCE PROJECT
(Oct. 22, 2013), https://www.innocenceproject.org/new-study-finds-false-confessions-morelikely-among-juveniles/.
11. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
12. History of the Juvenile Death Penalty, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/lifestyle/wellness/1988/07/19/history-of-the-juvenile-death-penalty/d2ebf62e-3c6f-4f9bb673-d6d607e0154a/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
13. Id.; see WILLIAM BRADFORD, BRADFORD’S HISTORY “OF PLIMOTH PLANTATION”: FROM
THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT 475 (Boston, Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1898); Crime and
Punishment in Plymouth Colony, MayflowerHistory.com, http://mayflowerhistory.com/crime (last
visited Feb. 23, 2020).
14. Leviticus 20:15 (King James); see BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 475 (citing Leviticus
20:15).
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the colony’s elders that the young man had sex with a mare.15 Since
the Puritan Separatists first arrived in New England in 1620, the law
of this new plantation was a mix of the biblical and English common
laws.16 Justice was administered by individual church congregations
and later by chosen elders.17
As the taking of a life for a crime, including a sexual crime, was
a major ethical and legal question, the elders of Plymouth Plantation
sought the advice of their most respected leaders and clergy. The
discussion that the reverend elders of the colony had is recounted in
the writing of William Bradford, leader of the Pilgrims18 and governor
of the colony intermittently for nearly thirty years.19
Three questions were posed to the elders in March 1642:
1. Was the act of bestiality a capital crime which required a
death sentence?
2. Is one witness, plus a confession from the accused admitting
his crime, sufficient to convict in a case of a capital crime?
3. How far may a magistrate go to extract a confession from a
youth in a case of a capital crime?20
On the first two questions, elders John Reynor, Ralph Partrich,
and Charles Channcy concluded bestiality was a crime against nature
and God, punishable by death, as set forth in Leviticus 20:15.21 But
they felt one witness was not sufficient, absent other confirming
evidence.22 They did agree, however, that one witness, plus a
confession from the accused admitting he had participated in the
“unnaturall and unclainnes” of bestiality, was sufficient for a judgment
of death.23 However, there was much discussion on the question of:
“[H]ow farr a magistrate may extracte a confession from a delinquente
15. BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 474–75.
16. Christopher Fennell, Plymouth Colony Legal Structure, PLYMOUTH COLONY ARCHIVE
PROJECT (Dec. 14, 2007), www.histarch.illinois.edu/plymouth/ccflaw.html.
17. Id.; Plymouth Colony, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (Dec. 7, 2019),
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/united-states-and-canada/us-history/plymouth-colony; see
also Rebecca Beatrice Brooks, History of Plymouth Colony, HIST. MASS. BLOG (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://historyofmassachusetts.org/plymouth-colony-history/; Plymouth Colony Drafts the First
Laws in North America, NEW ENG. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/
plymouth-colony-drafts-first-laws-north-america-1636 (last updated 2017).
18. BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 472–73.
19. Plymouth Colony, supra note 17.
20. BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 464–74.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 466.
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to acuse him selfe of a capital crime, seeing Nemo tenetur prodere
seipsum.”24
The Church of England separatists who fled to the new world
were very familiar with persecutions by the English Crown25 and the
tactics of the Spanish Inquisition.26 Therefore, the elders agreed
caution should be taken so that “no one is bound to incriminate or
accuse himself” falsely.27 All three elders questioned the use of torture
and even the administration of an oath to God when questioning a
youth.28 The elders concluded:
[H]e [magistrate] may not extracte a confession of a capitall
crime from a suspected person by any violent means, whether
it be by an oath imposed, or by any punishmente inflicted or
threatened to be inflicted, for so he may draw forth an
acknowledgmente of a crime from a fearfull inocente . . . .29
So, the elders specifically ruled out torture as a means to extract
a confession. And, they felt asking the youth to swear to tell the truth
when charged with a capital crime would also produce no trustworthy
confession.30 Instead, the elders concluded:
A magistrate is bound, by carfull examination of
circumstancces & weighing of probabilities, to sifte ye
accused, and by force of argumente to draw him to an
acknowledgement of ye truth.31
Elder Charles Channcy ended his written remarks on how a magistrate
should question a youth with this:
24. Id. at 465–72 (emphasis added). Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum is Latin for “no one is
bound to incriminate or accuse themselves.” Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum Law and Legal
Definition, U.S. LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/n/nemo-tenetur-prodere-seipsum (last
visited Feb. 23, 2020).
25. History.com Editors, Plymouth Colony, HISTORY (last updated Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.history.com/topics/colonial-america/Plymouth; Plymouth Colony, supra note 17.
26. The Story of the Pilgrims II: The Leyden Years, MILLS, MCLAUGHLIN, RADLOFF & RUTH
FAMILY PAGES, http://www.millsgen.com/gen/hist/pilstor2.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2020) (“If
Spain renewed the war and re-took the Netherlands, it would bring with it the terrifying Spanish
Inquisition, whose task it was to search out and destroy all forms of dissent against the Roman
Catholic church.”); see also Who Were the Pilgrims?, PLIMOTH PLANTATION,
https://www.plimoth.org/learn/just-kids/homework-help/who-were-pilgrims (last visited Feb. 23,
2020) (“To make matters worse, the congregation worried that another war might break out
between the Dutch and Spanish.”).
27. Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum Law and Legal Definition, supra note 24.
28. BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 464–74.
29. Id. at 467.
30. Id. at 465–67, 472–73.
31. Id. at 467.
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The Lord in mercie directe & prosper Ye desires of his
servants that desire to walk before him in truth &
righteousness in the administration of justice, and give them
wisdome and largnes of harte.32
In a private meeting with the magistrate, Thomas at first denied
the charges, but, after continued questioning, he confessed to his crime
of bestiality.33 There is no record of what the magistrate said to the
young man.34 Thus, we do not know how the magistrate weighed the
probabilities or circumstances of Thomas Granger’s denials. Most
importantly, we do not know if the magistrate told the youth he had to
confess if he ever expected to walk before God where “truth &
righteousness prevails.”35
But the magistrate’s record does state that Thomas confessed to
having sex with a mare, a cow, two goats, five sheep, two calves, and
a turkey.36 Thomas again confessed to his crimes in open court to a
jury.37 Given the witness’s statement and Thomas’s confession, a
sentence of death was pronounced.38 The animals involved were
slaughtered in front of Thomas and buried in a large pit.39 No part of
them was allowed to be consumed by humans.40 Thomas was then
hanged.41
Thomas Granger, like so many other minors, was tried under
adult law.42 But he was the only minor put to death in Plymouth
Colony for a sexual crime.43 It is interesting to note that, nearly four
hundred years ago, the issue about what is permissible when

32. Id. at 474.
33. Id. at 475.
34. Id. at 474–75.
35. Id. at 474.
36. Id. at 474–75.
37. Id. at 475.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. To read the original transcript of Governor Bradford’s diary, see BRADFORD, supra
note 13.
42. Alexandra Wilding, Juvenile Justice System Stems from 1899 Illinois Law, CUMBERLAND
TIMES-NEWS (June 1, 2011), https://www.times-news.com/news/local_news/juvenile-justicesystem-stems-from-illinois-law/article_a8065591-44a4-5b65-aa2a-bbbbed931e02.html;
see
Plymouth Colony Drafts the First Laws in North America, supra note 17 (“From the colonial period
through most of the 1800s, children beyond the ‘age of reason,’ usually age 7, were held to adult
standards of behavior,” being tried under adult laws, and for the most part, sentenced as adults).
43. Plymouth Colony Drafts the First Laws in North America, supra note 17.
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questioning a youth about a crime was heavily debated by those in
authority in Plymouth Colony.
III. WESTWARD HO
As the colonies grew, settlers moved across the Appalachian
Mountains into the Appalachian Plateaus and the Adirondacks, in a
great migration westward that did not stop until the settlers reached
the Pacific Ocean.44 In this migration west, justice for the settlers was
formed by the harsh environments of the land, diseases, hostile Native
Americans, isolated living conditions, the lack of organized law, and
the need for swift, individual justice.45 Often times, talion law
prevailed:46
And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life,
eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot,
burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.47
Most of the time, there was no trial. Rather, justice was dispensed
by gun or hanging as determined by those present or by vigilante
mobs.48 In San Francisco, public trials were staged outdoors and often
resulted in public corporal punishment and executions.49
California, more than any other western territory, attracted
thousands of immigrants from all over the world with the discovery of
gold on January 24, 1848.50 At the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-American War on February 2,
1848, the population of the California territory was approximately
6,500 Californios, people of Spanish or Mexican decent; 700
44. History.com Editors, Westward Expansion, HISTORY (last updated Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.history.com/topics/westward-expansion/westward-expansion.
45. Carleton W. Kenyon, Legal Lore of the Wild West: A Bibliographical Essay, 56 CALIF. L.
REV. 681, 686–99 (1968); see also GEORGE D. LANGDON, JR., PILGRIM COLONY: A HISTORY OF
NEW PLYMOUTH 1620–1691 93 (1966) (“different circumstances” in the hazardous territory made
“rigid adherence to English law” less impelling).
46. “Talion, Latin lex talionis, principle developed in early Babylonian law and present in
both biblical and early Roman law that criminals should receive as punishment precisely those
injuries and damages they had inflicted upon their victims. Many early societies applied this ‘eyefor-an-eye’ principle literally.” Talion, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/talion (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
47. Exodus 21:23–25 (King James); see also Talion, supra note 46.
48. 1800–1860: Law and Justice: Overview, ENCYLOPEDIA.COM (last updated Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/news-wires-white-papers-and-books/1800-1860-law-andjustice-overview.
49. Id.
50. The
California Gold Rush, PBS:
THE
GOLD
RUSH
(Sept. 13, 2006),
http://www.shoppbs.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/goldrush/peopleevents/e_goldrush.html.
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foreigners, primarily American; and 150,000 Native Americans.51 In
1846, the population of San Francisco was barely 200.52 By the end of
1848, San Francisco and the surrounding area had a non-NativeAmerican population of over 100,000.53 By the height of the gold rush
in 1850, the total population in California was 200,000, of which
180,000 were men and 20,000 were women.54 This gender imbalance
brought thousands of single women from all over the world who were
seeking not only their fortune, but also mates in a state with an
abundance of men.55
Some of the innocent victims of this California migration were
the neglected, abandoned, and illegitimate children whose parents
died, abandoned them, or could not control them due to the harsh
conditions of life.56 When possible, these wayward children were
cared for by relatives, neighbors, churches, orphan societies, and later,
state-run homes.57 However, large numbers of young children were
found begging, wandering the streets in the company of thieves and
prostitutes, or frequenting dance halls, saloons, or any other place that
might provide temporary comfort, food, and shelter.58 Left alone to
fend for themselves, these children became a burden and a threat to
the communities they lived in.59 This was especially true in the goldcrazed city of San Francisco, which had a fast-growing population of

51. Id.
52. San Francisco Population, SFGENEALOGY:
SAN
FRANCISCO
HISTORY,
https://www.sfgenealogy.org/sf/history/hgpop.htm (last updated Jan. 5, 2018).
53. Id.
54. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 25 (1975).
55. Nancy J. Taniguchi, Weaving a Different World: Women and the California Gold Rush,
CAL. HIST., Summer 2000, at 141, 143; History.com Editors, California Gold Rush, HISTORY
(last updated Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/westward-expansion/gold-rush-of1849.
56. Diane Nunn & Christine Cleary, From the Mexican California Frontier to ArnoldKennick: Highlights in the Evolution of the California Juvenile Court, 1850–1961, 5 J. CTR. FAM.,
CHILD. & CTS. 3, 6–10 (2004); see also Daniel Macallair, The San Francisco Industrial School and
the Origins of Juvenile Justice in California: A Glance at the Great Reformation, 7 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2003); Unknown Author, Untitled Article, DAILY DRAMATIC CHRONICLE,
Dec. 4, 1865, at A1.
57. Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 3–6; see also Juvenile Court Law §§ 8–9, 1909 CAL.
STAT. 213–16.
58. Inauguration of the Industrial School Address by Colonel J.B. Crockett, S.F. DAILY
BULL., May 17, 1859, at 1; Macallair, supra note 56, at 13; Unknown Author, Untitled Article,
DAILY DRAMATIC CHRON., Dec. 4, 1856, at A1.
59. THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 60 (1992).
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children under the age of fifteen.60 How to manage these youthful
offenders plagued local authorities.
IV. CHILDREN AS ADULTS
The problems San Francisco and its charitable societies faced can
be found in the newspapers of the time:
John Murphy, a thirteen-year-old hoodlum, who spends half
his time in the clutches of the police, stabbed a boy in the
Everett House yesterday during a quarrel. . . . Young
Murphy fled, but was soon afterward caught by the police
and locked up in the City Prison charged with assault with
intent to commit murder.61
Another of the boy criminals . . . is a gawky, dirty faced little
youngster . . . 15 years old. He looks about 10 years. Judge
Smith obviously don’t know what to do with an infant
charged with a crime [stealing a bicycle] punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary. He ordered the case
postponed.62
One wonders what eventually happened to these particular
children and the hundreds like them. At the time, children who
committed serious crimes were tried under adult laws and
consequently sentenced to jail or prison along with adult men.63 In the
late 1850s, the California Prison Committee reported that San Quentin
State Prison, an adult facility, housed over 300 boys, some as young
as twelve years old.64 The report listed an additional 600 children
confined in adult jails throughout the state.65

60. Macallair, supra note 56, at 12 (1860 census: number of San Francisco children under 15
were 12,116; 1867 census: number of San Francisco children under 15 were 34,710).
61. A Boy Stabber, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 1888, at 3; Angus Macfarlane, History of
California’s Juvenile Court, ch. 33, at 7 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
62. Boy Criminal: He Perplexes Court, L.A. DAILY TIMES, May 15, 1903, at 2; Macfarlane,
supra note 61, at 12.
63. EDWIN M. LEMERT, SOCIAL ACTION & LEGAL CHANGE: REVOLUTION WITHIN THE
JUVENILE COURT 33 (1970); Juvenile Justice History, CTR. JUV. & CRIM. JUST.,
http://www.cjcj.org/Education1/Juvenile-Justice-History.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
64. Macallair, supra note 56, at 24 (citing California Youth Authority, The History of Juvenile
Detention in California and the Origins of the California Youth Authority 1850–1980 39–41 (1981)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the California Youth Authority in Sacramento, CA)).
65. Id. (citing California Youth Authority, supra note 64).
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V. PARENS PATRIAE
In the later part of the 1800s, a widespread disillusionment
developed with the practice of jailing children with adults and the
maltreatment of children by supposed enlightened reform schools.
Movements sprang up demanding that children not be prosecuted
under adult criminal laws and delinquency be treated in more humane
ways.66 Judge Ben Lindsey of Colorado was one of the first judges to
establish a way to treat children differently than adults.67 At first, the
Denver judge used both probation and the state’s truancy laws of 1899
to keep children in school rather than sending them to jail or reform
schools.68 Later, he used the ancient common law doctrine of parens
patriae69 to assert jurisdiction over children, not as criminals, but as
“Civil Wards of the State” in need of correction.70
The concept of parens patriae, where the state steps in civilly and
not criminally when dealing with juvenile delinquency, raised a
theoretical question about how the state may deprive children of their
liberty. As time went on, many states, courts, and scholars argued that
judges should have unlimited scope and power over juvenile
delinquents.71 They theorized that “the child is not entitled, either by
the laws of nature or of the State, to absolute freedom, but is subjected
to the restraint and custody of a natural or legally constituted guardian
to whom it [the child] owes obedience and subjection.”72 Thus, the

66. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1967); LEMERT, supra note 63, at 34–35; Nunn & Cleary,
supra note 56, at 10–12.
67. Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 10–12; see also Judge Benjamin Barr Lindsey (1869–
1943), DENVER PUB. LIBRARY: GENEALOGY, AFRICAN AM. & WESTERN HIST. RESOURCES,
https://history.denverlibrary.org/colorado-biographies/judge-benjamin-barr-lindsey-1869-1943
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
68. Paul Colomy & Martin Kretzmann, Projects and Institution Building: Judge Ben B.
Lindsey and the Juvenile Court Movement, 42 SOC. PROBS. 191, 197 n.1 (1995).
69. Parens patriae is Latin for “parent of his or her country,” the power of the state to act for
those who are unable to care for themselves, such as the public policy of the state to act as the
parent of any child who needs protection. Parens Patriae, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/parens_patriae (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
70. CHARLES LARSEN, THE GOOD FIGHT 28–29 (1972); Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 11;
see also Judge Benjamin Barr Lindsey (1869–1943), supra note 67 (describing Judge Lindsey’s
biography).
71. James E. Duffy, Jr., In re Gault and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Juvenile
Court, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 68, 70 (1967).
72. Id.
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theory of parens patriae granted the nation’s judges nearly absolute
power when dealing with juvenile delinquency.73
As the theory of parens patriae started to be applied to juveniles,
the state of Illinois passed the Juvenile Court Act, creating the first
juvenile court and probation system for children in the nation.74 This
legislation provided a civil law model where children were treated not
as criminals, but as youths in need of reform. The Illinois system was
soon duplicated throughout the nation.75
A. Individualized Juvenile Justice
Throughout this time, California law was developing. While of
English common law in origin, the California justice system had a
unique Western-Spanish influence through the concept of the Mexican
alcaldes, where local elders administered justice in a paternalistic and
benevolent, if not dictatorial, manner.76 This form of justice fit well
with the old west tradition of personal self-reliance and stubborn
individuality.77 However, at the time, individualized justice meant that
treatment or punishment was dispensed depending on who a person
was, whether they had committed an offense before, and the type of
offense they were now charged with.78
One judge in 1910 summarized the role of parens patriae in
California’s juvenile justice system as follows:
I sincerely trust no attempt will be made to prescribe the
exact processes that the court should follow in these
[juvenile] cases. The legislature should lay down the
essentials which are to govern. That ground has generally
73. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1967). This would be the state of juvenile law until Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
74. Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 11–12.
75. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century:
Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 42–46
(Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002); Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 11–12.
76. DAVID J. LANGUM, LAW AND COMMUNITY ON THE MEXICAN CALIFORNIA FRONTIER:
ANGLO-AMERICAN EXPATRIATES AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS, 1821–1846 37–40
(1987) (explaining that these local mayors or judges ruled as they saw fit, undeterred by legal
precedents or standards); WILLIAM J. PALMER & PAUL P. SELVIN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN
CALIFORNIA 3–13 (1983).
77. Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 1.
78. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 7–9 (“The penalty specified in the Criminal Code [of Arizona],
which would apply to an adult, is $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months.”).
Fifteen-year-old Gault, who was on probation for assisting another boy steal a wallet out of a purse,
was sentenced to the State Industrial School for the period of his minority (that is, until twentyone), unless sooner discharged by due process of law. See id. at 4.
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been covered . . . beyond that the legislature should not
circumscribe the exercise of judicial authority in these
cases.79
B. Denial of Constitutional Rights
As the juvenile courts applied the civil doctrine of parens patriae,
constitutional rights guaranteed to adults were unnecessary for
children because the state was acting civilly in the best interest of the
child.80 “These results were to be achieved, without coming to
conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings
were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens
patriae.”81 It should be noted that the phrase parens patriae was taken
from English common law, wherein the state acts in loco parentis for
the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of a
child.82 However, there is no history of the parens patriae doctrine in
English criminal law.83 The use of the doctrine in juvenile criminal
cases was a legal fiction created in an effort to decriminalize juvenile
delinquency.84
Because the courts relied on individualized justice, the courts’
treatment of juveniles was uncoordinated and inconsistent. Thus, two
boys could be treated differently when committing the same criminal
act due to the child’s history, prior encounters with the law, or family
circumstances.85 In California, punishment for crimes was also treated

79. LEMERT, supra note 63, at 41; Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 16.
80. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15–16; STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN
DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF “PROGRESSIVE” JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825–1920 10,
31–38 (1977); Janet Friedman Stansby, In Re Gault: Children Are People, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1204,
1207 (1967); Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 549
(1957); see, e.g., In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (Pa. 1954); Paul W. Alexander, Constitutional
Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD: THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSITION 82,
90–91 (Margaret Keeney Rosenheim ed., 1962); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L.
REV. 104, 109–10 (1910).
81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16.
82. Id.
83. TIMOTHY D. HURLEY, ORIGIN OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW 320, 328 (3d ed.
1907); Paulsen, supra note 80, at 548–49 (1957).
84. See BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 464–74; Judge Benjamin Barr Lindsey (1869–1943),
supra note 67; Duffy, supra note 71, at 69 n.3 (arguing that the philosophy of parens patriae through
individual justice was undoubtedly a backlash from the pre-1899 treatment of children in adult
criminal courts).
85. Duffy, supra note 71, at 69.
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differently from county to county.86 This emphasis on individualized
justice by a benevolent, parent-like state was stressed in juvenile
courts to the point where due process was ignored and, many times,
justice denied.87
Through the years, due process for juveniles in California was
completely circumvented by the courts.88 For example, in Ex parte Ah
Peen,89 the California Supreme Court ruled that a sixteen-year-old boy
who was “leading an idle and dissolute life” in San Francisco and
whose parents were unknown should be sent to a state school for
children until he was reformed or reached legal adulthood.90 Even
though confinement was ordered, this ruling was handed down
without a jury trial because the purpose was not to punish the child for
any criminal behavior but to reform and train him.91
The California Supreme Court reiterated this philosophy of
juvenile law in its 1924 decision In re Daedler92 when it denied a jury
trial to a fourteen-year-old accused of murder.93 The court stated that
“[t]he processes of the Juvenile Court Law are, as we have seen, not
penal in character, and hence said minor has no inherent right to a trial
by jury.”94
VI. IN RE GAULT: A REVOLUTION IN JUVENILE LAW
In 1965, the Arizona Supreme Court, in denying a writ of habeas
corpus filed by the parents of fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault,
summarized the then-philosophy many juvenile court systems
throughout the United States believed in and followed:
[J]uvenile courts do not exist to punish children for their
transgressions against society. The Juvenile court stands in
the position of a protecting parent rather than a prosecutor. It
is an effort to substitute protection and guidance for
86. LEMERT, supra note 63, at 61 (noting that drinking, fighting or sexual experimentation
may be overlooked, while damaging ranch equipment or stealing cattle could elicit a strong,
punitive reaction).
87. See In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523, 535 (Pa. 1954); LANGUM, supra note 76, at 30–31.
88. Juvenile Court Law §§ 8–9, 1915 CAL. STAT. 1231–32; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1967);
LEMERT, supra note 63, at 31–32.
89. 51 Cal. 280 (1876).
90. Id. at 281.
91. Id.
92. 228 P. 467 (Cal. 1924).
93. Id. at 472.
94. Id. But see Ex parte Becknell, 51 P. 692 (Cal. 1897).

(6) 53.3_MCINNIS (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

6/8/2020 3:40 PM

THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

567

punishment, to withdraw the child from criminal jurisdiction,
and use social science regarding the study of human behavior
which permit flexibilities within the procedures. The aim of
the court is to provide individualized justice for children.95
On December 6, 1966, the United States Supreme Court heard the
appeal of the Gaults from the Arizona Supreme Court ruling.96 In
appealing the Arizona court’s rulings, the Gaults challenged the
philosophy of both parens patriae and individualized justice by
claiming such juvenile processes violated their Fourteenth
Amendment rights.97
The United States Supreme Court upheld the philosophy of
parens patriae by accepting the entire premise of the juvenile court
model—juveniles were delinquents, not criminals; juveniles should be
reformed, not criminally punished; juvenile proceedings were civil in
nature; and the juvenile courts are not open to the public so as to
protect the child’s delinquent acts from the public98—but the Supreme
Court did not accept the premise that these benefits could only be
preserved if juvenile offenders were not afforded due process rights.99
The Supreme Court firmly rejected the argument that introducing due
process rights for children would prevent the juvenile courts from
performing their quasi-parental function of protecting and reforming
the child.100
The Supreme Court found such rationalization unconstitutional
and determined children are persons protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment when accused of crimes in a delinquency proceeding.101
As such, youthful offenders must be given many of the same due
process rights as adults. Accordingly, the Court went on to require
certain criminal trial procedures as part of a juvenile’s due process
rights. These due process rights included: (1) the right to legal counsel;
(2) the privilege against self-incrimination (i.e., children do not have
to admit charges or testify against themselves); (3) the right to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and the evidence;
(4) the right to notice of the charges and all hearings; (5) the right to
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760, 765 (Ariz. 1965), rev’d, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11 n.7, 22–27, 31 n.48.
Id. at 30–31.
Id.
Id. at 41.
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transcripts of all proceedings; and (6) the right to appellate review.102
The most significant of these six was the right to counsel. For the first
time, juvenile courts were required to allow defense attorneys in the
adjudication of delinquency proceedings and, through the other
enumerated due process rights, the ability to mount a defense to the
charges.
A. Due Process Incomplete
While In re Gault signaled a new approach to delinquency
proceedings, the constitutional rights of children have not always been
protected to the same extent as the courts protect adult rights. This is
because juvenile courts still grapple with their dual charge of
protecting the community while at the same time acting in the best
interest (parens patriae) of youths. As a consequence, in some states,
juveniles can waive their right to legal counsel. For example, in
Maryland, Louisiana, Florida, Ohio, and Kentucky, more than half of
the children waive their right to counsel, and these waivers are
accepted by the court.103 But can a youth waive the right to counsel
and fully understand the consequences of such a waiver, especially at
sentencing? In adult court, “judges are reluctant to grant a waiver of
counsel unless the accused understands the nature of the charge and
its statutory requirements, the range of punishments, the possible
defenses and circumstances of mitigation, and other facts necessary to
defend against the charges.”104 The question of whether youthful
offenders can understand their constitutional rights, knowingly waive
those rights, and fully comprehend the nature of a police investigation,
the meaning of their own interrogation, and the consequence of being
arrested, tried, and sentenced in juvenile court, reveals a fundamental
flaw in the way children are treated in the criminal justice system.105
B. Due Process and Juvenile Interrogation
In In re Gault, the Supreme Court questioned the ability of a child
in juvenile court proceedings to comprehend and knowingly waive his
102. Id. at 41–59.
103. Cheryl D. Wills, Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court 50 Years After In re Gault, 45 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 140, 142 (2017) (citing Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right
to Counsel in Juvenile Court—A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. Art. 5, 1, 7 (2008)).
104. Id.; see In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41–42.
105. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36–37 (right to counsel); id. at 55–57 (right to confrontation,
cross-examination, and self-incrimination); Wills, supra note 103, at 142.
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or her constitutional rights.106 The same must also be asked regarding
a child’s ability to understand and knowingly waive those same rights
when being questioned by the police. The Supreme Court in In re
Gault further questioned the veracity of juvenile confessions by
quoting Dean Wigmore:
[B]ased on ordinary observation of human conduct, that
under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective
mentality or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge
guilt. This possibility arises wherever the innocent person is
placed in such a situation that the untrue acknowledgment of
guilt is at the time the more promising of two alternatives . .
. .107
Further, the Supreme Court held that one of the purposes of the
right against self-incrimination was to prevent the state, “whether by
force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and
will of the person under investigation and depriving that person of the
freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing their
conviction.”108 The Court went on to find:
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable
foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential
term in the social compact which defines the rights of the
individual and delimits the powers which the state may
exercise.109
Justice Douglas stated, “Neither man nor child can be allowed to
stand condemned by methods which flout the constitutional
requirements of due process of law.”110 Applying such constitutional
standards to interrogation, the Court said, “It is frequent practice that
rules governing the arrest and interrogation of adults by the police are
not observed in the case of juveniles.”111 Why is this? It is our belief
that there is a parental urge in all of us that dictates how we as adults
approach children, in particular when a child appears to have gone
astray.
106. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41–42, 55–56.
107. Id. at 44–45 (quoting 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940)).
108. Id. at 47; see also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961) (convictions based
on involuntary confessions “cannot stand”).
109. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20; see also id. at 20 n.26 (discussing impact of denying due
process to juveniles).
110. Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948)).
111. Id. at 14.
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C. The Role of Parens Patriae Post In re Gault
Many are of the belief that, when juveniles confess to a criminal
act, they are not incriminating themselves since no criminal conviction
may result in juvenile court. Indeed, most children also hold this belief
not knowing that they may be tried as adults in many instances. This
is nothing more than a continuing belief in the practice of parens
patriae when dealing with juveniles. Others believe that confessing is
good for the soul and is the first step toward reformation, an important
part of juvenile justice. Accordingly, the refusal to admit one’s wrongs
indicates that the child does not understand his or her antisocial
behavior and needs further reform, which again is a reflection of the
parens patriae theory.112 However, despite these beliefs, history has
shown that “confessing” oftentimes yields problematic results for
juveniles.
In In re Gault, the Arizona juvenile court took the young fifteenyear-old boy from his family and committed him to a state school
simply because he made an obscene phone call to a female
neighbor.113 In Kent v. United States,114 a sixteen-year-old boy was
arrested for burglary and rape.115 He was interrogated for a day and a
half and, ultimately, admitted to participating in the crimes.116 The
juvenile court waived jurisdiction and remitted the boy to adult court
for trial where the boy’s confession was used to convict.117
In the summer of 1989, five juveniles confessed to raping and
beating a New York woman.118 Later called “the Central Park Five,”
these youths were tried as adults and convicted based on their
confessions.119 The police were criticized for the tactics they used to
elicit the confessions. The defense argued to the courts that the
juveniles did not understand their right to remain silent or their right
to an attorney, and consequently, they unknowingly waived their

112. See Gilbert T. Venable, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional
Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 PITT. L. REV. 894, 910 (1966).
113. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
114. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
115. Id. at 543.
116. Id. at 543–44.
117. Id. at 551.
118. Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions—Lessons of the Central Park Jogger
Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 216–17 (2006).
119. Selwyn Raab, Central Park Case Puts Focus on Tough Juvenile Law, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 1989, at B1.
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Miranda rights.120 Eventually, the convictions were overturned when
another man confessed to the attack and his confession was confirmed
through DNA evidence.121
In 1998, in the matter of Crowe v. County of San Diego,122 teams
of police continuously interrogated three fourteen-year-old boys for
over eight hours throughout the night regarding the murder of Michael
C.’s twelve-year-old sister.123 During a juvenile court hearing to
determine the suitability of the boys for juvenile court treatment, the
confessions elicited by the police were, in part, allowed and
disallowed due to violations of Fifth Amendment warning
requirements.124 All three boys were ordered to stand trial as adults for
murder.125 As one of the boys’ trials was commencing, DNA testing
found the deceased girl’s blood on a vagrant’s clothing.126 The charges
against the boys were dropped, and the vagrant was tried for the girl’s
murder.127 The three boys were later found by a judge to be “factually
innocent” of the murder.128 Although found innocent, the three
nevertheless had to suffer through their teen years under the specter of
being involved in a murder. These cases, like so many others, raise the
issue of the ability of juveniles to knowingly waive their constitutional
rights when questioned by the police or other state authorities.
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly highlighted the
vulnerability of juveniles when dealing with the criminal justice
system. In Haley v. Ohio,129 Justice Douglas wrote:
Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He
cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity.
That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the
period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence
produces. A 15-year-old lad, questioned through the dead of
120. Davies, supra note 118, at 216–19.
121. Karen Freifield, A 2002 Report on the Central Park 5 Convictions Being Overturned,
AMNY, https://www.amny.com/news/central-park-five-1-32018864/ (Dec. 20, 2002).
122. 608 F.3d 406 (9th Cir. 2010).
123. Id. at 417.
124. Id. at 425.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 417.
127. Id.
128. Teri Figueroa, Escondido: Michael Crowe and Friend ‘Factually Innocent,’ Judge Says,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (May 22, 2012, 11:44 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
sdut-escondido-michael-crowe-and-friend-factually-2012may22-story.html.
129. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
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night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the
inquisition.130
In 1962, the Supreme Court reiterated its position in regard to
juveniles’ ability to waive their constitutional rights in Gallegos v.
Colorado:131
[A fourteen-year-old boy] cannot be compared with an adult
in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the
consequences of his admissions. He would have no way of
knowing what the consequences of his confession were
without advice as to his rights—from someone concerned
with securing him those rights—and without the aid of more
mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the
predicament in which he found himself. . . . Adult advice
would have put him on a less unequal footing with his
interrogators. Without some adult protection against this
inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let
alone assert, such constitutional rights . . . . To allow this
conviction to stand would, in effect, be to treat him as if he
had no constitutional rights.132
The United States Supreme Court has, for over seventy years,
recognized the inability of children to understand their constitutional
rights and make a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Yet,
the courts still allow the police to admonish children of their Miranda
rights and then proceed, through deceit, intimidation, and
psychological manipulation, to extract confessions from their hapless
victims. The justification for allowing such an abuse of constitutional
rights is that the courts prefer to look at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogations in determining whether
the confessions are reliable.133

130. Id. at 599.
131. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
132. Id. at 54–55. Gallegos, age fourteen, and another juvenile followed an elderly man to a
hotel room where they assaulted him and stole thirteen dollars. Arrested later, Gallegos, after being
held five days without seeing an attorney, parent, or any other friendly adult, confessed. In juvenile
court he was sentenced to the state industrial school. After the sentencing, the elderly victim died.
Gallegos was charged with first-degree murder and tried as an adult. His confession, made and
signed before the victim died, was used in adult court to convict him. Id. at 49–50.
133. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44–46 (1967) (discussing confessions and citing Dean Wigmore
on the necessity to examine the conditions surrounding the confession to determine its
trustworthiness).
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VII. THE INTERSECTION OF JUVENILE
DEVELOPMENT AND DUE PROCESS
When a person doesn’t understand his or her Miranda rights,
those rights have no meaning.134
By the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the
twenty-first century, multiple disciplines, including neuroscience,
psychology, and sociology, came to a conclusion that Aristotle and
subsequent generations of parents, scholars, and societies had known
for centuries: adolescents are less able to control themselves and are
more prone to risk-taking compared to adults.135 But now these
modern multiple disciplines had incontrovertible evidence that
adolescence is a period of significant change in a youth’s brain
structure and function, and a period of change in which the adolescent
is extremely susceptible to peer or group pressure.136
One of the most significant scientists in adolescent brain
development is Laurence Steinberg. Through numerous studies, he has
determined that there are four significant “structural” brain changes a
youth experiences while going through adolescence:
1. There is a decrease in gray matter in the prefrontal regions of
the brain due to the elimination of unused neuron
connections. This occurs mainly during pre-adolescence to
early adolescence when children experience increases in basic
cognitive abilities and reasoning.137
2. In early adolescence, especially during puberty, there is a
substantial increase in the amount of dopamine receptors,
134. Hum. Rts. Watch, You Have the Right to Remain Silent—California Bill Strengthens
Miranda for Kids, YOUTUBE (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVW8Ldw6YI&t=30s (noting that children have “less capacity to understand their rights.”).
135. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 72. For examples of the different disciplines’ literature on the
adolescent mind, see Alison S. Burke, Under Construction: Brain Formation, Culpability, and the
Criminal Justice System, 34 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 381, 382–83 (2011); Eveline A. Crone &
Maurits W. van der Molen, Developmental Changes in Real Life Decision Making: Performance
on a Gambling Task Previously Shown to Depend on the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 25
DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 251, 251–52 (2004); Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic
Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI., June 2004, at 77, 83.
136. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 71; see also Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the
Delinquent, 7 KY. CHILD RTS. J. 16, 16–17 (1999) (discussing adolescent brain development and
their inability to use advanced judgment under stress); Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform
Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, NAT’L JUV. JUST. NETWORK (Sept. 2012),
http://www.njjn.org/our-work/adolescent-brain-research-inform-policy-guide-for-juvenile-justice
(discussing teens’ susceptibility to peer pressure “[b]ecause of the changes in the emotional and
decision-making centers of the brain”).
137. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 70.
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which connect the limbic system and prefrontal cortex,
enhancing how humans experience pleasure, such as
sensation seeking.138
3. There is an increase in the nerve networks connecting brain
regions, in particular a strengthening between the prefrontal
cortex and limbic system. This increases communication
between different brain systems. This process continues into
late adolescence.139
4. There is an increase in white matter that results in
myelination, the process through which nerve fibers become
sheathed in myelin, improving the efficiency of brain circuits.
This increase in efficiency produces higher-order cognitive
functions, such as planning ahead, risk versus reward
analysis, and complicated decisions. This process continues
into late adolescence and early adulthood.140
Professor Steinberg also found, “Adolescence is not just a time of
tremendous change in the brain’s structure. It is also a time of
important changes in how the brain works.”141 He found three distinct
changes in brain functions:
1. During adolescence and into early adulthood, there is a
strengthening of brain activity involving self-regulation. It
appears a wider area of brain regions are used by adults,
which makes self-control easier than during adolescence.142
2. Brain scans show that adolescents’ reward centers are more
active than in young children or adults. Anticipated rewards
appear to motivate adolescents to engage in risky acts.143 This
hypersensitivity is increased when in groups or with
friends.144
3. As the adolescent enters adulthood, there is an increase in the
number of brain regions involved in response to arousing
stimuli. Before adulthood, the adolescent has less cross talk

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71; GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 18 (2018).
144. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 71.
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between brain systems that regulate rational decision-making
and those that regulate emotional arousal.145
Science has concluded that these structural and functional
changes do not occur at the same time in all youths.146 Further, brain
areas used in cognitive processing reach adult levels by midadolescence, whereas brain self-regulation does not fully mature until
late adolescence or even into early adulthood.147 “In other words,
adolescents mature intellectually before they mature socially or
emotionally.”148
Although the understanding of how juvenile minds develop has
progressed, the law has been slow to catch up. The United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged that adolescents are not on the same
“developmental playing field” as adults.149 However, despite this
delayed “developmental playing field,” juveniles are read the same
Miranda warnings as adults.150 Consequently, these warnings are
often futile due to juveniles’ inability to understand and exercise these
rights.151 It is no surprise that only about 10 percent of juvenile
suspects invoke their Miranda rights152 compared to the 40 percent of
adult suspects who invoke their rights.153 This low percentage for
juveniles can likely be attributed to two factors: (1) juveniles fail to

145. Id.
146. Id.; Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity in
the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F2 (2011).
147. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 71.
148. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 70–71; see also Adam Ortiz, Adolescence, Brain Development,
and Legal Culpability, AM. B. ASS’N: JUV. JUST. CTR., Jan. 2004, at 1, 2–3; Leah H. Somerville et
al., A Time of Change: Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Adolescent Sensitivity to Appetitive
and Aversive Environmental Cues, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 124, 124–26 (2010) (“Common
behavioral changes during adolescence may be associated with a heightened responsiveness to
incentives and emotional cues while the capacity to effectively engage in cognitive and emotion
regulation is still relatively immature.”).
149. Pamela Witmer, Statistically Speaking: Juveniles, Interrogation Techniques and
Development: Do Law Enforcement Officers Really Understand the Adolescent Brain?, CHILD
LEGAL RTS. J. 60, 60 (2011); see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005).
150. Lorelei Laird, Police Routinely Read Juveniles Their Miranda Rights, but Do Kids Really
Understand Them?, AM. B. ASS’N. J. (June 1, 2016, 2:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/police_routinely_read_juveniles_their_miranda_rights_but_do_kids_really_und.
151. Jamie Knight, When Miranda Misses Its Mark: A Proposal for Heightened Protections for
Juvenile Interrogations, 31 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 28, 30 (2011).
152. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of
Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977); Richard Rogers
et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 63, 65 (2008).
153. Grisso & Pomicter, supra note 152.
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comprehend the Miranda warnings themselves; and (2) juveniles fail
to understand the dangers of waiving their Miranda rights.
In the 1970s and 1980s, studies by Thomas Grisso looked at
juvenile and adult comprehension of the Miranda warnings.154 Grisso
found that only 20.9 percent of juveniles understood each of the four
Miranda warnings.155 In contrast, about 42.3 percent of the adults
understood the Miranda warnings.156 Additionally, even if juveniles
understood the Miranda warnings, many were unable to effectively
exercise these rights because “[j]uveniles [did] not fully appreciate the
function or importance of [these] rights.”157
In a study at the turn of the twenty-first century by Naomi E.
Sevin Goldstein et al., comparisons were made to the earlier studies
by Grisso.158 The more-recent testers found:
Miranda comprehension in the early 21st century is similar
to the levels of understanding of delinquent boys in the
1970s. Despite speculation that youth are more
knowledgeable about police interactions and Miranda rights
than children 3 decades ago, this research suggests that
adolescents’ Miranda comprehension has not significantly
improved over time. This continuity across generations
suggests that Miranda comprehension may be a
developmental skill beyond the capacity of young
adolescents.159
Similarly, like the adolescents in the Grisso study three decades
prior, juveniles in the Goldstein 2003 study did not know that they
were entitled to speak with an attorney before questioning and have an
attorney present during the interrogation.160 In addition, a similar
percentage of youths “mistakenly believed that lawyers only
protect[ed] the innocent and that the right to silence can be revoked at
a later date by a judge.”161 Vocabulary played an important part in both
survey results, with “interrogation” and “consult” being the most
154.
155.
156.
157.

See Grisso, supra note 9.
Id. at 1153.
Id.
Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 23
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 409–10 (2013).
158. See Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein et al., Juvenile Offenders’ Miranda Rights Comprehension
and Self-Reported Likelihood of Offering False Confessions, 10 ASSESSMENT 359, 366 (2003).
159. Id. at 366.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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commonly misunderstood words.162 Juveniles understood the word
“interrogation” to have something to do with a court hearing, and
“consultation” to mean a simple conversation.163
In another recent study, researchers Richard Rogers, Lisa
Hazelwood, and Kenneth Sewell concluded that the standard Miranda
warnings are indeed far beyond the cognitive abilities of juveniles.164
More specifically, the study concluded that juveniles thirteen years or
younger cannot “grasp key Miranda components related to their right
to an attorney or parental assistance.”165 The research found that to
understand the word “right,” suspects must possess at least an eighthgrade education.166 To understand the word “waive,” juvenile suspects
must possess more than a high school education.167 Researchers also
noted that, as a result of stress, a suspect’s comprehension level
decreases by at least 20 percent during an interrogation.168
Consequently, many juvenile suspects simply lack the comprehension
skills required to fully understand the Miranda warnings being read to
them.169 For juvenile suspects to meaningfully waive their rights, they
must do so “knowingly.”170 Yet, the above research demonstrates that
juveniles lack the ability to understand each right. Thus, it is
questionable whether juveniles may even knowingly waive their
Miranda rights—which demonstrates all the more the need to be
assisted by legal counsel. Such a conclusion is significant since more
than 1.5 million juveniles are arrested and Mirandized each year.171
Moreover, along with an inability to understand Miranda rights,
juveniles also face problems invoking their Miranda rights.172 In a
study by Nicole Bracy, researchers looked at whether juveniles aged
twelve to seventeen understood their Miranda rights and how
juveniles perceived the interrogating officers.173 This study revealed
that, along with a low understanding of legal vocabulary, “juveniles
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Rogers et al., supra note 152, at 75.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 72.
167. Id. at 78.
168. Laird, supra note 150.
169. See Rogers et al., supra note 152, at 75.
170. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
171. Rogers et al., supra note 152, at 63.
172. Brian Werner, Did They Ever Stand a Chance? Understanding Police Interrogations of
Juveniles, 3 THEMIS 158, 171 (2015).
173. Id. at 170–71.
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are not independently capable of understanding the consequences of
waiving their Miranda warnings, and youth expressed overconfidence
in being able to resist police pressure.”174 Not surprisingly, these
results intensified as the juveniles’ age decreased.175
Additionally, juveniles are taught from an early age to obey and
answer authority figures.176 These social expectations leave juveniles
in a vulnerable position because interrogators can easily persuade
juveniles to waive their Miranda rights.177 Consequently,
“[a]dolescents are more likely than young adults to make choices that
reflect a propensity to comply with authority figures, such as
confessing to the police rather than remaining silent.”178
This trend is demonstrated in a 2003 study by Hayley M. D.
Cleary. One thousand three hundred juveniles and young adults were
asked to choose the best scenario for “a vignette character (among
confessing to the offense, denying the offense, and refusing to
speak).”179 Roughly half of the eleven- to thirteen-year-old juveniles
indicated confession as the best option.180 However, the number of
people picking confession declined considerably with age.181
Ultimately, “Miranda warnings and waivers require sufficient
ability to understand their constitutional protections and rationally
apply them to waiver decisions at the pre-interrogation stage.”182
Without a complete understanding of Miranda, children often waive
these protections, which leaves their basic constitutional rights
vulnerable.183 Despite the studies showing the underdeveloped
juvenile brain and its inability to fully understand the Miranda
warnings, juveniles are still provided the same Miranda warnings as
adults—warnings that are wholly insufficient to protect juveniles’
constitutional rights. Without an adequate understanding of their
174. Id. at 171.
175. Id.
176. Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children’s Rights, 16
NOVA L. REV. 711, 715–16 (1992).
177. Kevin Lapp, Taking Back Juvenile Confessions, 64 UCLA L. REV. 902, 916–17 (2017).
178. Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 357 (2003).
179. Hayley M. D. Cleary, Police Interviewing and Interrogation of Juvenile Suspects: A
Descriptive Examination of Actual Cases, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 271, 271 (2014).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Rogers et al., supra note 152, at 66.
183. Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 134 (noting that children have “less capacity to understand
their rights”).
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Miranda rights, juveniles consequently speak with law enforcement,
subjecting themselves to challenging and deceptive interrogation
techniques.
A. Interrogation Techniques of Juveniles
One of the consequences of juveniles waiving their constitutional
rights is they are subjected to police interrogation techniques, which
even adults find challenging. Teenagers may appear adult-like because
they have gone through puberty and have some adult features. But
their brains still have years of developing to do before they will have
the cognitive abilities to even understand the consequences of their
actions.184 Nonetheless, interrogation techniques used on juveniles
over the age of fourteen tend to mirror those used with adult
suspects.185
The use of adult interrogation techniques is likely the result of law
enforcement’s misconception of juvenile mental development.186
More specifically, one study found that law enforcement views
juveniles similarly to adults in interrogation settings.187 Further,
“police indicated that suspects of all ages understand their rights and
intent of interrogations.”188 This misconception is problematic
because children have a reduced ability to withstand coercive
interrogation techniques—techniques that cause false confessions.189
Researchers who study false confessions have concluded that the
following factors play a role in or cause false confessions:
• Real or perceived intimidation of the suspect by law
enforcement;
• Use of force by law enforcement during the
interrogation or perceived threat of force;
• Compromised reasoning ability of the suspect due to
exhaustion, stress, hunger, substance use, and, in
some cases, mental limitations or limited education;
184. Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE
& TREATMENT 449 (2013).
185. Werner, supra note 172, at 168.
186. Id. at 171.
187. Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding
Juvenile Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 757, 773–74 (2007).
188. Werner, supra note 172, at 171–72.
189. Tamar Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons,
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 414 (2008); Knight, supra note 151, at 28.
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•

Devious interrogation techniques, such as untrue
statements about the presence of incriminating
evidence; and
• Fear, on the part of the suspect, that failure to confess
will yield a harsher punishment.190
Such factors also adversely affect juveniles fourteen years or older.191
A study by B. C. Feld found that the top five interrogation techniques
used with juveniles included confronting the juvenile with evidence,
accusing the juvenile of lying, presenting the juvenile with
inconsistencies, compelling the juvenile to answer honestly, and
questioning the juvenile with behavioral analysis interview
questions.192 Ultimately, the researchers found that juveniles were
subjected to the same coercive strategies and tactics used on adults
during interrogations.193
“While many adults often succumb to the pressure of
interrogation, such tactics more often result in false confessions in
juveniles due to their still-maturing psychological, emotional, and
cognitive abilities.”194 For one, juveniles are particularly susceptible
to suggestive questioning by authority figures.195 As a result, juveniles
are more likely to adopt an inaccurate version of events during police
interrogations.196 Additionally, juveniles fail to consider the long-term
consequences of confessing to a crime because of their
underdeveloped prefrontal cortex.197 This is especially “problematic
in custodial interrogations because police often tell juveniles that, in
order to go home, they must tell them what they want to hear.”198 Thus,
a juvenile’s “eagerness to comply with adult authority figures,
impulsivity, immature judgement, and inability to recognize and
190. False Confessions & Recording of Custodial Interrogations, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/false-confessions-admissions/ (last visited Feb. 23,
2020).
191. Werner, supra note 172, at 166–67.
192. Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogations of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and
Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 263–71 (2006).
193. Id.; see also Cleary, supra note 179, at 276–77 (finding that the interrogations averaged
about forty-six minutes, parents were often not contacted, there were frequent interruptions to the
questioning, juveniles sat in the corner, police stood between the juveniles and the door, and police
often stood close to the juvenile).
194. Witmer, supra note 149, at 60.
195. Birckhead, supra note 189, at 417.
196. Id.
197. Werner, supra note 172, at 166.
198. Id.
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weigh risks in decision-making” may lead them to falsely confess
rather than consider the consequences.199 As noted by other experts:
Drizin and Leo explained the young persons’ vulnerabilities
in terms of being less mature and having had less life
experience than older suspects, leaving them feeling more
intimidated and coerced and less able to cope with the
demand characteristic of the police interrogation. The
younger the person, the greater the likelihood that he/she will
waive their rights to legal advice and give a false
confession.200
Ultimately, the fundamental brain differences between juveniles and
adults place juveniles at a significant disadvantage in criminal
interrogations.201 Thus, given that juveniles face a greater
vulnerability to police coercion and yet are subjected to adult
interrogation techniques, it is no surprise that children falsely confess.
B. False Confession Rates
The exposure to sophisticated psychological techniques of
interrogation, in turn, has produced an unacceptably high number of
false confessions. According to FalseConfessions.org, of the two
million men and women imprisoned in the United States, as estimated
by the Department of Justice, “as many as 50,000 involved false
confessions.”202 Further, 63 percent of known false confessors were
under the age of twenty-five, and 32 percent were under the age of
eighteen.203 Of those under eighteen years old, 16 percent were
juveniles arrested for murder and rape.204 Another study established
that 42 percent of juvenile exonerations involved false confessions in
comparison to only 13 percent of adult exonerations.205 Today,
juveniles “are over-represented” in false confessions, which

199. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 1005 (2004).
200. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FALSE CONFESSIONS: FORTY YEARS OF
SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 124 (2018) (citations omitted).
201. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 816 (2003).
202. Facts and Figures, FALSECONFESSIONS.ORG, https://falseconfessions.org/fact-sheet/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2020).
203. Id.; GUDJONSSON, supra note 200, at 134–35; Witmer, supra note 149, at 60.
204. Facts and Figures, supra note 202.
205. Witmer, supra note 149, at 60.
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“suggest[s] that children . . . may be especially vulnerable to the
pressures of interrogation and the possibility of false confession.”206
C. No Specific Rules Exist for Questioning Juveniles
Despite the alarming rate of false confessions, the Supreme Court
has failed to proscribe special procedures for juvenile interrogations
beyond those delineated in J.D.B. v. North Carolina.207 States are
afforded great freedom to determine their own rules for interrogating
juveniles.208
For example, several states, including California, have no rules
requiring the police to notify the parents of a juvenile when their child
is being questioned.209 The police are required to read juveniles the
Miranda warnings at the time of arrest though if the juvenile is
arrested.210 If the officers do not question a juvenile again for several
hours, they are not required to repeat the Miranda warnings to the
juvenile.211
The mounting evidence and research on child brain development
indicates that more reform is needed to protect the constitutional rights
of children during the police investigation stage. More specifically,
reform in police interrogation techniques and the development of new
juvenile Miranda warnings is wholly overdue.
VIII. MODIFIED MIRANDA WARNINGS FOR CHILDREN
To improve children’s comprehension of their constitutional
rights, the following modified Miranda warnings are suggested:
A. Children’s Miranda Warnings
1. You have the right to remain silent. This means you do not
have to say anything or answer my questions or any other
officer’s questions.

206. Drizin & Leo, supra note 199, at 944.
207. 564 U.S. 261, 262–63 (2011) (holding that a child’s age is a relevant factor to consider in
determining whether the child is in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona); see Feld, supra
note 157, at 399.
208. GEORGE COPPOLO, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH,
INTERROGATION OF MINORS-PRESENCE OF PARENTS OR GUARDIANS (2000),
https://cga.ct.gov/2000/rpt/2000-R-0282.htm; Werner, supra note 172, at 168.
209. Werner, supra note 172, at 168.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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2. Anything you say may be used against you. This means what
you say can be used against you in juvenile court or, if
charged as an adult, in adult court. This means what you say
can get you in serious trouble.
3. Before and during all questioning, you may have your parent
or guardian present and may talk privately with your parent
or guardian. This means before you say anything to us or at
any time during our conversation, you may talk with your
parent or guardian.
4. You or your parent or guardian may talk to an attorney, free
of charge, before talking to us.
5. You or your parent or guardian may stop the interview at any
time.
6. You or your parent or guardian may, at any time, have an
attorney with you during questioning for free.
Do you want to talk to your parent or guardian?
Do you want to have an attorney present?
Do you want to talk to us?
Miranda warnings are only effective if those warnings are fully
understood. To advance the understanding of their rights, a Children’s
Bill of Rights is proposed:

1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

B. Children’s Bill of Rights
A child shall have the same constitutional rights as an adult.
A child has the right to be advised of his or her Miranda rights
when detained and questioned, in a manner suited to the
child’s intellectual development.
A child shall have present, before and during any questioning,
a parent or guardian or legal caregiver (“custodial parent”)
who shall exercise the child’s Miranda rights in the best legal
interest of the child.
A request by a child to talk to a custodial parent shall
constitute the invocation of the child’s Miranda right to
remain silent.
No child or custodial parent shall waive the Miranda rights of
a child fourteen years or younger without first talking to an
attorney, who must agree that the child’s Miranda rights may
be waived.
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6. A child fifteen years or older may waive his or her Miranda
rights only after the child and the child’s custodial parent
consult with an attorney.
7. If the child or the child’s custodial parent cannot afford an
attorney, one shall be provided at no cost before the child is
questioned.
8. The child, the child’s custodial parent, and the child’s attorney
shall be advised of the nature of the matter being investigated
and why the child is being questioned.
9. When the custodial parent is suspected of committing a crime,
an attorney shall be provided, at no cost, to represent and
advise the child regarding the child’s Miranda rights, and the
attorney shall be present during questioning of the child.
10. If the child is suspected of a criminal offense, the child’s
attorney shall advise the child and the child’s custodial parent
that the child may be charged as a juvenile offender subject to
detention and rehabilitation under juvenile law, or, when
allowed by law, charged and sentenced as an adult, including
a sentence of life in prison.
11. All questioning of a child who has been detained shall be
video recorded. The recording shall be preserved for use in a
court of law irrespective of whether the child is charged with
a criminal offense.
12. A child shall not be questioned for more than four hours in a
twenty-four-hour period and shall be allowed to eat and rest
for eight hours between periods of questioning.
IX. CONCLUSION
While the United States Supreme Court and lower court rulings
acknowledge juveniles are a susceptible class of the population that
warrant unique safeguards, the constitutional rights of children in the
investigatory stage of criminal cases are wholly deficient. The
proposed modified Miranda warnings will assist youths in better
understanding their constitutional rights. However, given the
sophisticated techniques used by today’s police and the vulnerability
of juveniles to adult authority, more is needed to ensure that children
know the consequences of waiving their rights.
The reliance on parental or guardian advice raises problematic
issues when the interests of the custodial adult do not coincide with
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those of the juvenile. Further, few adults understand the consequences
of waiving Miranda rights, and can themselves be subject to
persuasive tactics by the police, resulting in the parent telling the child
to cooperate with the police. Thus, there is a need to ensure juveniles
are provided conflict-free support and appropriate legal advice. To this
end, the Children’s Bill of Rights offers protection presently not
available to the children of our nation.
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